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SUBMISSION TO ELECTORAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM COMMISSION 
 
REFERENCE 122S: THE ENTRENCHMENT OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS IN THE QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION 
 
 
If I had unlimited time I would have something to say about almost every aspect of your Issues 
Paper No. 20, but under pressure of your deadline I will concentrate on two major points:- 
 
•  the desirability of at least some of our fundamental civil and political rights being 
entrenched in the State's Constitution, to be changed only by approval of the majority of 
the electors at a referendum, and 
 
• the need, under our existing Constitutional Act, for any such entrenchment to first be 
approved itself at a referendum (which, as I argue below, is no bad thing). 
 
After that, I will make some suggestions as to- 
 
•  the kinds of rights which ought to be submitted for entrenchment - though it will 
become clear below that I think that the actual selection of the rights is, in a way, less 
important than the general principle that the people can, by referendum, specify the 
limits of legislative power. 
 
 
WHY SOME OF OUR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE 
ENTRENCHED IN THE STATE'S CONSTITUTION 
 
Sovereignty of Parliament versus Sovereignty of the "People" 
 
I start from the premiss that almost everyone in Queensland, except for a few élitists, believes in 
something called democracy.  Philosophers may argue over exactly what that means, but at least 
it means that laws are made by representatives of the "people" (ie, the competent adult citizens), 
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and that all of the "people" (as just defined) are entitled to vote in the selection of our 
representatives.  Lincoln's definition will do: "government of the people, for the people, and by 
the people".  Thus our political theory is that, in some sense, the "people" are sovereign.  [No 
confusion should arise here because we still have a Queen - she is "the sovereign" in the sense 
that she is the head of the executive, but the ultimate power to make and break governments has 
long since devolved to the people.] 
 
Yet our legal theory, inherited from Prof Dicey, is that the Parliament is sovereign.  This idea 
can be justified ex post facto by an appeal to the idea of democracy - since Parliament 
represents the people, and is now elected by all of them (as defined above!), to place fetters on 
the power of Parliament would be to fetter the people.  But to maintain that, you really must 
believe in a "general mandate" theory of government - that once we elect the government, we 
are authorising them to do anything, whether promised in an election policy or not, and whether 
compatible with democracy or not. 
 
In fact, it is doubtful whether Dicey's idea is derived in any way from democratic ideals.  It was 
a description of English Parliamentary practice as it had developed since 1688.  The English 
Parliament had succeeded to the legal sovereignty once held by the monarch by leading the fight 
against the monarchs (in the name of the people) in the seventeenth century - but once it had 
won, it no more thought of limiting its power over the people than any Stuart King had ever 
done.  Dicey's view, indeed, contains strong echoes of Hobbes's claim that, to escape the evils of 
the state of nature, men (the women are missing from Hobbes's Commonwealth) "confer all 
their power and strength upon one man, or assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by 
plurality of voices, unto one will" - and Hobbes, despite your charitable misrepresentation of 
him on pp 12-13 of the Issues Paper, was a defender of absolutism, not of individuals' rights.  
 
Even if we can charitably ascribe to Dicey the view that Parliament was sovereign because of 
some democratic principle, at the time when he was writing "democracy" had not been given the 
meaning that we now give to it.  The Parliament was not elected by all of the adult people 
(though by the time of his last edition most males had the vote).  In the United Kingdom and in 
Queensland all competent adult citizens now have the vote, but that is because Parliament, in 
response to much political campaigning, has decreed it so - and according to Dicey's theory, 
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Parliament could even take that right back - here in Queensland, just as in the United Kingdom 
- if a majority of politicians saw advantage in it.  No, Parliamentary sovereignty does not have 
any necessary connection with the sovereignty of the people. 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty may not, these days, usually clash with the sovereignty of the people, 
but that does not mean that we do not need to express the sovereignty of the people in the State's 
Constitution.  When the English and Scots rebelled against their Kings, they saw the executive 
as the enemy of the people's rights and Parliament was the agent of the people.  In Dicey's Law 
of the Constitution there is still an implication that the only possible enemy of the people's 
freedoms is the executive, and that the Parliament will always protect the people from executive 
ambition.  But since 1688 real power has been transferred to the Ministers and their advisers, 
and a strong party discipline operates; this had largely happened by the time that Dicey wrote, 
but he seems not to have noticed!  
 
The individuals who make up Parliament may represent us, but they also have ambition, they 
have party loyalties, and those who become Ministers have much more day-to-day contact with 
senior members of the Public Service than they do with their constituents.  Both the 
Parliamentarians and the senior executives who advise them may be generally benign, but there 
is no guarantee that they will not occasionally forget the interests and traditional rights of the 
people who vote for them, and sacrifice them to party interests or executive convenience.  We 
have seen examples over the last decades of Parliaments changing the electoral laws to the 
dominant party's advantage.  We have seen the right of peaceable assembly made subject to 
appeal to the Police Commissioner (at a time when the incumbent Police Commissioner was  
clearly content to take orders on such matters from his Minister and the Premier).  Supposedly 
"minor" amendments to the criminal laws have been presented to the Parliament, and only quick 
scrutiny by the Law Society and Bar Association has revealed that significant extra powers were 
being given to the police.  I am not suggesting that the police should not have more power in 
some cases, but the almost deceptive way in which it was to be done suggests that we had an 
executive which thought "We can do anything we like, any way we like."  The doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty encourages Ministers and their advisers to think that way.  We need a 
Constitution which spells out at least some limits on government power - some entrenched Bill 
of Rights - to stop them from thinking that way. 
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The Referendum - The Only Acceptable Form of Entrenchment 
 
Many objections to the notion of a Bill of Rights focus on the "fossilisation" argument, 
mentioned in your Issues Paper at paras 7.50-7.57. (I gather from newspaper reports that these 
objections surfaced again at the public seminar which you held recently.)  Bentham put the 
objection with his usual rhetorical brilliance in Anarchical Fallacies, his critique of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen; the anxiety to establish fundamental laws is 
 
 ... the old conceit of being wiser than posterity - wiser than those who have had more 
experience, - the old desire of ruling over posterity, - the old recipe for enabling the dead 
to chain down the living.. 
 
The Privy Council has claimed that, in contrast to the French or Americans,  
 
 some communities, and notably Great Britain... have shrunk from the assumption that a 
degree of wisdom and foresight has been conceded to their generation which will be, or 
may be, wanting to their successors, in spite of the fact that those successors will possess 
more experience of the circumstances and necessities amid which their lives are lived.  
(McCawley v R (1920) 28 CLR 106, at 114-115)   
(The British "community" has been acting through its politicians and judges, apparently, as it 
has never been asked directly!)  
 
Michael Detmold sees in this, quite rightly, a "substantial constitutional value" which he names 
"inter-temporal equivalence", which he then uses as the basis of a general attack on the notion 
that a State Parliament can bind its successors by prescribing a special "manner and form" for 
passage of certain kinds of law.  (The Australian Commonwealth, Law Book Co., 1985, esp pp 
207-208. 
 
Bentham, the Privy Council, and Detmold are absolutely right as long as we are considering 
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something like a declaration of "imprescriptible" rights - a list of fundamental rights which are 
to be binding for all time.  The objection would also apply to a provision that a law is not to be 
repealed except by a two-thirds, or three-quarters majority, or a unanimous vote, of Parliament.  
Such provisions indeed reflect a tremendous presumption on the part of those who enact them - 
or a tremendous determination to be unfair to the Opposition who might (horror!) win 
government at the next election!  It seems to me that most of the arguments against Bills of 
Rights (and Detmold's arguments against any "manner and form" provisions) stem from an 
implied assumption that they will be entrenched by some provision which makes them 
impossible to repeal - a kind of folk memory that, once upon a long time ago, the word 
"imprescriptible" was used. 
 
But there is one kind of fetter on Parliament's power - one kind of manner and form provision - 
which is perfectly compatible with democracy and with inter-temporal equivalence.  This is a 
requirement that certain kinds of laws not be amended or repealed  unless a majority of the 
electors approves of the change at a referendum.  It has often been used in Australia and 
continental Europe, though the British and Canadians still regard it with a certain horror, and the 
Americans remain satisfied with an extremely indirect reference to the people for their 
constitutional change.  In Australian case law a referendum requirement has been approved as 
not incompatible with the sovereignty of Parliament, but merely a redefinition of the sovereign 
body (Attorney-General v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394); nor does it amount to an improper 
renunciation of Parliament's powers (West Lakes Ltd v South Australia (1980) 25 SASR 389, 
esp per King CJ at 397).  Such a provision is not saying to future generations that no laws can 
ever be made on certain topics, but is saying to present and future Parliaments "There are some 
kinds of laws you cannot make without asking us, the people, for authority".  Future 
Parliaments retain their right to propose changes to the Constitution, and future generations of 
the "people" retain their right to approve or disapprove the proposals. 
 
One rejoinder to this might be that Australian experience shows that it is so hard to get the 
electors to approve a Constitutional alteration that anything entrenched by a referendum 
requirement might as well be made unrepealable.  Somehow this observation is then combined 
with the "fossilisation" argument to show that a Bill of Rights is undesirable.  I find this 
argument very odd.  If a government puts a proposal to the people and the majority votes "no", 
  
 
EARC Reference 122S - Submission by John Pyke 
7 
so be it.  If what the proposers wanted to change was something approved by the people of an 
earlier generation, then the people of this generation are not being "chained down by the dead"; 
they have re-affirmed the judgment of the earlier generation.  Inter-temporal equivalence has 
been preserved.  It is true that recent experience in referenda concerning the Commonwealth 
Constitution has suggested that the people can be frightened into voting "no" by a campaign 
relying on scare tactics and misrepresentation, but - again - so be it.  If those campaigning for 
change cannot put their argument persuasively, then there will be no change.  (And I can't 
refrain from observing that the "yes" campaign for every Commonwealth referendum in the last 
twenty years has been extremely feebly argued; in fact the term which best expresses my 
opinion of their weakness is not quite appropriate for a formal submission such as this!  If some 
of the proponents of Constitutional change could rediscover some of the arts of political 
persuasion from the days before written Parliamentary speeches, the Constitution might not be 
seen as difficult to change. But enough of that...)  The requirement for a referendum is not only 
defensible, but is the only defensible method of entrenching the preservation of rights in a 
Constitution.  It is not only defensible, but necessary if a Constitution is to reflect the principle 
of the sovereignty of the people. 
 
Another argument that is used against referenda is that they are expensive to hold. So are 
elections!  Of course we don't want a fifty-million dollar campaign every month, but if we 
begrudge the money spent on ascertaining the people's will then we might as well give up on 
democracy and ask the Institute of Directors to nominate a Führer!  I wonder if that is what 
some of the people who complain about the cost of elections and referenda really want? 
 
[This next point is going somewhat beyond your brief, but it is worth making here.  The 
necessity of a special amendment procedure is not only essential for the protection of political 
rights, but should be seen the distinguishing feature of a Constitution.  The fundamental 
political right should be the right of the people, collectively, to control our own 
Constitution. Any American or continental European would take that for granted.  The fact that 
we have a Constitution Act - in fact, a dog's breakfast of separate Constitution Acts - is an 
oddity derived from our former colonial status.  What we really need to do is to sort out which 
provisions are sufficiently important that they should only be amended with the assent of the 
people, put them in a wholly entrenched State Constitution, and relegate all other provisions to 
  
 
EARC Reference 122S - Submission by John Pyke 
8 
ordinary statutes with ordinary names. ] 
 
Why Only a Simple Majority at a Referendum? 
 
Some might want to go further than my suggestion above, and make some rights free even from 
majority repeal.  From a philosophical point of view there are some potential paradoxes in 
democracy, if that means that all decisions are made by majority vote.  If the philosophical basis 
of democracy is something like Dworkin's "right to equal concern and respect" of all people 
(and I don't know what else it can really be), then even a majority vote should not be allowed to 
deprive minorities of basic rights, especially the right to take part in future voting.  Yet it seems 
to me that trying to entrench "really fundamental" rights by something more stringent than a 
simple majority requirement would, in the end, be futile - as well as a breach of inter-temporal 
equivalence.  If a 51% majority of people of the State voted to deprive aboriginal Australians, or 
women, of voting rights, or Muslim Australians of the right to worship, then respect for rights 
would be in a pretty bad way, and I doubt that preservation of these rights by a 75% majority 
requirement would be terribly effective.  To generalise, I doubt that entrenched rights can be 
used as a defence against "the tyranny of the majority"; their job is to defend the people against 
those who might be tempted to tyrannise in the name of the majority without consulting it.  And 
incidentally, they will remind the majority of each generation what rights the majority of 
previous generations have valued; perhaps this would in itself make the later generation pause 
before it jettisoned any of the specified rights.  If, after taking pause, the later generation 
tramples on some of the rights valued by my generation, so be it; I really have no more desire 
than Bentham to rule coercively from the grave! 
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Sovereignty of the People versus Sovereignty of the Judiciary: a novel kind of 
"notwithstanding" provision 
 
The other main objection to a Bill of Rights - and probably the most cogent one - is that a Bill of 
Rights transfers the power which rightly belongs to the people or their Parliament to the 
judiciary, that it politicises the judiciary and gives them legislative power.  [This is canvassed in 
some detail in your Issues Paper in paras 7.32-7.49.]  To the extent that this is based on the 
notion that the judiciary does not legislate in ordinary common-law cases, it is at least a trifle 
romanticised.  The judiciary has always legislated, in a quiet, "interstitial" way (show me anyone 
who says that the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 was not a legislative act 
and I'll show you someone who hasn't read the previous cases on negligence!)  But it is true that 
the judiciary should not have the same broad scope for decisions that the legislature has.  It is 
also true that we can find plenty of horrible examples of capricious or controversial decisions in 
the American case law on the Bill of Rights, starting with the dreadful (irresistible pun!) Dred 
Scott v Sandford 19 Howard 393 (1857). 
 
To some extent this problem can perhaps be minimised by careful drafting of rights provisions - 
I essay some preliminary suggestions near the end of this submission.  I also submit that the 
problem is likely to be less acute in Australia now than it might have been even ten years ago, 
now that appellate courts have, at last, decided that evidence of the purpose of statutory and 
Constitutional provisions is an important factor in their interpretation. If we adopt some rights 
provisions with some clear messages as to their intended meaning in EARC reports or a 
Minister's speech, those messages will now be taken into serious consideration by courts 
interpreting the provisions.  
 
But it must be admitted that it remains quite possible, if we adopt a Bill of Rights, that in some 
future generation a court will invalidate a statute that would not have been seen as objectionable 
by a majority in the generation which adopted the provision or, more seriously, by a majority of 
the people in the future generation.  Doesn't this show that entrenching a Bill would hand 
supreme power to the judiciary?  And isn't a lack of inter-temporal equivalence raising its head 
again, indirectly?  The judges will be using their interpretation of one generation's intent to 
hobble the elected representatives of the later generation. 
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Again, however, this problem is only unavoidable if the rights in the Bill are said to be 
permanently binding, "imprescriptible".  Some of the attacks on the Bill of Rights in the United 
States seem to me to have a touch of humbug about them. The judges invalidate a law on civil 
libertarian grounds, or a less libertarian Court validates a law.  The cry of "rule by judiciary" 
goes up.  The response of the political parties is to try to stack the Supreme Court next time they 
are in power. The assumption seems to be that the Bill of Rights is something given to them by 
James Madison and friends, which they are powerless to amend openly, so they must do it only 
by re-interpretation. Yet it is amendable! It is open to any of the politicians who are offended by 
Supreme Court decisions to propose amendments to the Bill of Rights. They don't even have to 
put the proposal to the people - only their fellow politicians, though a complicated majority is 
required. But they don't - perhaps because they have a feeling that "people" are happy enough 
with the Bill as it is, and do not want it amended. It is easier to whinge about the Supreme Court 
than to try to re-state the Bill of Rights. If this generation of Americans is being ruled from 
Madison's grave, it is rule by persuasion, not by coercion - and that sort of rule is another 
fundamental of democracy, after all. 
 
I can, however, see one reply to my argument above which has some force. To stick with the 
American example, if the Supreme Court has just made a ruling based on the "unreasonable 
search and seizure" provision, politicians and indeed the people may want to override that 
without wholly abolishing the protection of the Fourth Amendment. It may be difficult to 
formulate an amendment which will permit the desired law without creating a worry that other, 
much less desirable, laws might also be authorised. So the politicians and the people do nothing 
- except to continue to grumble about the Supreme Court.  Any amendment may seem like too 
much of a "blank cheque".  But there is an easy cure for this problem too - another use of the 
referendum. Where a law has been declared invalid, or where the government fears that it may 
be declared invalid, it could be specifically validated by a referendum. I propose a new kind of 
"notwithstanding" clause, which would provide for the "submission to the electors" of doubtful 
Bills or Acts. [Perhaps it could even provide that where the Governor had reason to believe that 
a Bill would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (s)he had a personal power to 
direct that it be submitted to the electors?] Then it would provide; 
 
  
 
EARC Reference 122S - Submission by John Pyke 
11 
 Where a majority of the electors voting approve a Bill, and it subsequently becomes an 
Act on receiving the assent of the Governor in the name of the Queen, or where a 
majority of the electors voting approve an Act, the Act shall be valid notwithstanding 
any provision of this Constitution. 
 
The effect of such a clause would reinforce the sovereignty of the people, and inter-temporal 
equivalence.  To modify some of the language that I used above (end of first paragraph of p 3), a 
Bill of Rights would not be saying to future generations that no laws could ever be made on 
certain topics, but would be saying to present and future Parliaments "There are some kinds of 
laws you cannot make without asking us, the people, for general authority or specific approval 
of the law".  Future Parliaments would retain their right to propose laws or changes to the 
Constitution, and future generations of the "people" would retain their right to approve or 
disapprove the proposals. Entrenched rights would be compromised, not for the specious value 
of the sovereignty of Parliament, but for the sovereignty of the people. 
 
I suppose that such an original suggestion could raise the spectre of endless referenda, as in The 
Rise and Rise of Michael Rimmer. But I hardly imagine that once we have a Bill of Rights the 
government is going to want to fiddle at the boundaries of it every day. On the occasions when 
the government felt that some rights-limiting measure was justified, however, the 
"notwithstanding" clause would give it an opportunity to try to "sell" that justification to the 
people - and if the people voted "no" the government would have no cause to complain about 
rule by the judiciary, or rule by a past generation. They would have received a reminder that 
election by the people did not entitle them to do anything they felt like to the people's rights. 
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WHY A BILL OF RIGHTS WILL BE BINDING ONLY IF IT HAS FIRST BEEN 
APPROVED AT A REFERENDUM 
 
The Effectiveness of State Bills of Rights, in General 
 
Another legal argument that has been raised about a State Bill of Rights, entrenched by a special 
"manner and form" provision, is that it could not be made binding.  If the power to provide a 
special manner and form of passage of laws comes only from s 6 of the Australia Act 1986 
(which repeats the proviso to s 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865), then manner and 
form provisions would appear to limit only future Acts respecting the "Constitution, powers or 
procedure of the Parliament".  An Act inconsistent with a State Bill of Rights (eg, one restricting 
the right of peaceable assembly) could not, so the argument runs, be characterised as one 
respecting the Parliament's own constitution, powers or procedure, and therefore the special 
manner and form can be ignored.  I will refer to this as the "characterisation argument" below. 
 
There is, of course, an alternative analysis - the "reconstituted legislature" argument.  Subject to 
the point about s 53 of the Constitution Act 1867 that I am going to make below, the State 
Parliament has a general power to make laws changing its own Constitution.  This was found 
originally in the Order in Council of 6 June 1859 and the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, but 
now resides in s 2 of the Constitution Act 1867.  Once Parliament has made such a law, the 
constitution of the legislative body has been altered - a new element has been introduced into 
the legislative body, and "laws" made within the new body's field of power by the old body are 
not laws.  Rich J accepted this argument in Trethowan's case, above, at p 418, and it has been 
applied by the Supreme Court of South Africa in Harris v Minister of the Interior [1952] 2 SA 
428.  There are still academics (particularly Detmold, above, and Goldsworthy in (1987) 16 
MULR 403) who suggest that the Parliament as originally constituted can ignore its previous 
changes to its Constitution because it has a "continuing constitutive power".  I intend to refute 
these arguments in full in an academic paper, but for a submission such as this I will simply say 
that their reasoning is both out of line with how most people think about Constitutional change, 
and pretty poor deontic logic.  It is interesting to note that in his book on The Constitutions of 
the Australian States Professor Lumb first casts doubt on the effectiveness of a State Bill of 
Rights, referring to the characterisation argument (5th ed, pp 119-120), but ten pages later 
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develops the reconstituted legislature argument, and persuades himself and the reader that a Bill 
would be binding after all.  I submit that he is quite correct. 
 
The Special Case of Queensland - s 53 of the Constitution Act 
 
Another principle that is generally true, in States other than Queensland, is that a special 
"manner and form" provision can be prescribed in an Act enacted in the normal way - ie, 
passage by a simple majority in each of the Houses of Parliament, followed by the Governor's 
assent.  This is potentially anti-democratic, in that a party about to lose power could suddenly 
amend the Constitution so as to make laws favouring its supporters difficult to amend.  But, 
once again, if the only kind of manner and form provision under consideration is a requirement 
for a simple majority at a referendum, the objections lose their force.  If the outgoing 
government has entrenched something outrageous, the new government will face some trouble 
and expense, but repeal will occur fairly early in its term, if it acts promptly.  And if the 
outgoing government has entrenched something that the people do not want repealed, this will 
be another reminder to the new government that it has a limited mandate, not a general one.  Yet 
even so, it seems odd that "the people" can be given a power without being asked whether they 
want it.  [If someone wants to foist a legal power upon an individual, they generally have to 
ask, and even when it is not a legal requirement, it is an act of courtesy which most people 
observe!]  Yet the case law, and the logic underlying the cases, is pretty clear.  The NSW 
Parliament can insert a s 7A in its Constitution Act without consulting the electors, and, hey 
presto!, the electors have a right of veto over changes to the Legislative Council. 
 
However, I submit that things may be different in Queensland.  This is because in 1977 the 
Parliament inserted s 53 into the Constitution Act 1867.  This makes it impossible to amend 
certain sections referring to the Governor without approval at a referendum.  These sections 
include ss 2 and 2A, which provide: 
 
 
 2. Within the said Colony [sic!] of Queensland Her Majesty shall have power by 
and with the advice and consent of the said [Legislative] Assembly to make laws 
for the peace welfare and good government of the colony in all cases 
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whatsoever. 
 
 2A. (1) The Parliament of Queensland consists of the Queen and the Legislative 
Assembly referred to in sections 1 and 2. 
 
Though the main intention of inserting ss 2A and 53 was to preserve the position of the 
Governor against repeal, it seems to me that a by-product is probably that they also preserve the 
position of the Legislative Assembly against any shift of power to a reconstituted legislature - 
that an effect of the manner and form provision in s 53 is that no more manner and form 
provisions can be inserted without a referendum.  Whether this was accidental or pre-meditated 
is hard to tell; there is no mention of anything but the effect on the Governor in the 
Parliamentary Debates (30 November and 7  December, 1976), but the Nicklin government 
had tried to prohibit further manner and form provisions in its Bill of 1959 (see Issues Paper, 
para 5.69), and perhaps the Bjelke-Petersen government's advisers had not forgotten that aim? 
 
I concede that some may contest this interpretation of the 1977 amendments.  There is no 
evidence of Parliamentary intention to protect anyone but the Governor - but then, there is no 
evidence of an intention that only the Governor be protected either.  The legislature's power to 
reconstitute itself comes in the first place from s 2, so if you think too long about it you can run 
into all sorts of difficulties with self-reference, circularity, paradox and endless reiteration!  But 
I submit that the simplest way to break the circle is to say that s 53 has now passed the re-
constitutive power to the re-constituted legislature consisting of the Legislative Assembly, the 
electors, and the Queen.  When the Parliament has enacted manner and form provisions in the 
past, it has (unless you hold, contrary to the High Court and Privy Council, that the provisions 
are not binding!) limited its power to make laws "in all cases whatsoever".  Until 1977, it was 
able to do that - its omnipotence has been "self-embracing", to use the term quoted in your 
Issues Paper at paras 7.16-7.17.  So the scope of the words "in all cases whatsoever" has been, 
quite validly, decreased.  But now that s 2 is protected by s 53, any further creation of manner 
and form limitations, which would further reduce the scope of those words as they stood 
immediately after the commencement of s 53, would "expressly or impliedly in [some] way 
affect...section 2" - which, s 53 says, can only be done with the approval of the majority of the 
electors. 
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If there is any doubt in the logic, this interpretation is also supported by the fact that it is 
consistent with popular sovereignty.  If the power to insert manner and form provisions 
continues unabated, Parliament can not only insert a referendum requirement, but also less 
democratic provisions such as requirements for a three-quarters majority.  It really is just as well 
that the power has now been limited by s 53.  As I noted above, the creation of a new 
referendum requirement is not so objectionable to democratic principles, but even in this case s 
53 has a worthy effect in that it implements the principle that any grant of power should be done 
with the consent of the grantee.  
 
[I should note that I do not claim discovery of this effect of s 53 for myself. It was suggested in 
an assignment by one of my students two years ago.  I recorded his name, but lost the piece of 
paper on which I had done so!  As I have thought about this suggestion over the last two years, 
it has seemed increasingly clear to me that it is not only a proper interpretation of the words of s 
53, but a highly desirable one.] 
 
The government could of course simply present a Bill of Rights to Parliament and have it 
passed as an ordinary Act.  Even if it purported to create a special manner and form for its own 
amendment, on the argument above it would only take effect as an ordinary Act, which did not 
override later Acts.  I suppose the argument that such a Bill is "better than nothing" is true - but 
only in the same sense that winning two dollars is better than nothing when you were expecting 
a million! The point, in my submission, of a Bill of Rights, is that it spells out the submission of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and executive power to the people; if it is not enforceable it loses that 
point, though it may retain lesser, symbolic, ones. 
 
  
 
EARC Reference 122S - Submission by John Pyke 
16 
WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE PROPOSED FOR INCLUSION IN A BILL? 
 
The conclusions above suggest that it is a bit presumptuous to ask which rights the Parliament 
should include in a Bill of Rights.  Instead, the question becomes which rights should the 
Parliament propose to the people for their ratification?  It is even possible that it could propose 
alternatives, and let the people choose! There is evidently some irony involved here; the only 
body which has the power to put a proposal for the entrenchment of rights before the people is 
the one which is currently seen as "sovereign" and which, according to my proposal, should 
surrender its sovereignty.  I do have the impression that there may very well be a majority in 
Parliament at present which might be expected to approve such a proposal, but it does raise 
another issue for consideration: once we have a properly entrenched Constitution with some 
rights provisions, who should have the power to propose amendments?  I return briefly to that 
issue at the end of this submission. 
 
I submit here that the question of what rights should be embodied in the State's Constitution 
does not have to be decided all at one go.  What should be proposed first is enough to establish 
the basic principle that the people are sovereign over the Constitution and that the Constitution 
can spell out limits on the power of government.  This leads to the conclusion that the first ones 
to be specified should be civil and political rights against the government (even some that have 
not generally been stated expressly because they are taken for granted as part of the rule of law). 
 This includes both the classic "first-generation" rights and the administrative law rights which 
have been developed recently.  In a world where most of us are more likely to have trouble with 
a public servant than a member of the police force, perhaps due process of law needs a 
guarantee that applies to more than the criminal process, and perhaps freedom of information is 
as important as restrictions on search and seizure. I do not denigrate the ideas of rights against 
each other, or socio-economic rights, but I suggest that they can come later. What should be 
proposed for a first try is a set of rights about which there is a fairly strong consensus in the 
community; to try to spell out the extent of the "right to life", or to provide some Constitutional 
target of full employment will only derail the process if done as a first step. I suggest that the 
ones which ought to be considered are:- 
 
(i) A statement in s 2 of the Constitution Act that the Parliament's powers are "subject to this 
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Constitution and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia". 
 
(ii) An express statement of the principle of Entick v Carrington that the executive only has 
such coercive powers as are expressly granted by law. 
 
(iii) A guarantee of voting rights - the right to vote for all adult resident citizens, with scope for 
some limited disqualifications - and at least some limit on gerrymanders.  I'm all for equal-
enrolment electorates myself, but this is one area where a choice could be presented - the 
alternative could be some attempt to formulate the present allowance for large electorates as a 
general statement of principle. 
 
(iv) Some guarantee of freedom of speech.  Clearly there need to be limits, and whether these 
should be spelled out or left to the judiciary to develop I have not yet formed a view on.  One 
idea that might be worth considering is a fairly absolute guarantee of freedom of expression of 
political opinions and policies, getting more absolute during election campaigns; perhaps we 
ought to allow fanatics to say "There ought to be a law to deport all Asians" for the duration of 
an election campaign, while leaving it open for Parliament to pass laws forbidding racial 
vilification at other times?  
 
(v) A guarantee of freedom of religious belief and worship, and freedom to engage in religious 
practices so long as they do not involve a lack of respect for other persons' human rights (I think 
that would put paid to any claim that female circumcision would be protected as an allegedly 
religious practice). 
 
(vi) A guarantee of the right "to assemble peaceably, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances". I have taken this one straight from the United States Constitution 
because it is one whose interpretation has been less problematic than others. 
 
(vii) A guarantee of the independence of the judiciary. Such a guarantee exists, in appearance 
and for the Supreme Court only, in s 15 of the Constitution Act 1867 - but it is a non-guarantee 
at present because the Constitution is "flexible".  The guarantee should become entrenched, and 
a clause about non-diminution of salary added. Perhaps tenure should be extended also to 
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District Court Judges and magistrates - but if not, the purpose behind judicial independence 
would be preserved by a guarantee that in any criminal prosecution or matter to which the State 
is a party there is a right of appeal to judges having tenure of office. 
 
(viii) Some guarantees of administrative law rights:- free access to government information, 
with limited exceptions; the right to have decisions made in accordance with stated law or 
general policies on non-discriminatory grounds, and the right to be given reasons for decisions. 
 
(ix) Possibly a guarantee of "just terms" for persons whose property is acquired by the 
government.  I include this because I think it would reassure conservative voters that the idea of 
rights is not something from a radical agenda - in fact, Marxists denigrate it as a bourgeois 
invention. We do not have a class of zamindaris here, and I suggest that a clear statement, in the 
course of debate about the clause, that it was intended to be interpreted like the similar clause in 
the Commonwealth Constitution should be enough to allay fears that it would strike down laws 
for taxation or fines for criminal conduct. 
 
I suggest that that would be enough to establish the basic idea that rights are something that can 
be protected in a Constitution. Once that was established, it would be open to all persons 
interested in the political process to suggest further amendments. 
 
Who should have the power to propose changes? 
 
If, as I have suggested above, the most basic political right is the right of the people, 
collectively, to control our own Constitution, it seems too limiting to specify that only the 
Parliament can propose while our only right is to dispose.  One of the obvious alternatives is the 
"popular initiative" whereby a proposal must be put to the electors if a specified number of 
voters petition the Parliament for it.  Clearly the number should be fairly high; if we had to have 
a referendum every time ten people petitioned for a change to the Constitution, much money 
would be wasted and the process would be devalued (as in Michael Rimmer!).  Politicians 
might, however, be worried about this on the ground that amendments would be proposed by 
people with no practical experience of the problems of government. I have no great worry about 
the popular initiative, but if some other mechanism is desired there are two that spring to mind: 
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• some specified proportion of members of Parliament, less than a majority, so that the 
Opposition has a chance to propose changes; or 
 
• a provision for some periodic election of a Constitutional Convention, or constituent 
assembly, to propose changes. Many of those elected might still be politicians, but 
members would know that their function was to make changes to the basic law, rather 
than ordinary statutes; there is some historical evidence that this encourages them to 
take a longer-term view. 
 
We might even develop a political culture in which a government proposed changes but 
allowed the Opposition to propose rival changes, and in which intelligent debate about the 
consequences of the changes was encouraged! Then the people really would have taken charge 
of their own Constitution. 
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